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Abstract
To what extent can be electoral results in Catalonia explained by the exposure
of individuals to television? This paper sheds light on this question by looking
into the eﬀect of TV3 on two distinguished political outcomes in the 1984 Cata-
lan Parliamentary election. The outcomes of interest are voter turnout and the
vote share of Convergència i Unió (CiU), one of the strongest political forces in
Catalonia who has mainly driven the channel since its creation. We resort to a
natural experiment based on the geographically diﬀerentiated expansion of TV3 in
Catalonia. Using a Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Kernel matching method, we found
that the introduction of TV3 caused an increase both in the voter turnout and
the CiU vote share in the 1984 Catalan parliamentary elections.
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1 Introduction
Media have a strong eﬀect on politics. They can largely shape perception of individuals
and political leaders about the political world, and these perceptions become in turn
the basis for political beliefs and actions. That is why media are particularly important
during periods of rapid political changes, elections, and in times of political tensions
(violent or non-violent) when political leaders try to control and frame what media
covers (Graber, 2007). Thus, the understanding of how media can inﬂuence political
outcomes enables us to better understand politics.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on the eﬀect of media on politics
by identifying to what extent voting results in Catalonia can be explained by the expo-
sure of individuals to TV3 (Catalan public television). The literature on the political
economy of media has grown rapidly in the last decade and addresses a wide range
of research questions. Various excellent surveys have already been written (DellaVi-
gna and Gentzkow, 2010; Prat and Strömberg, 2013; Sobbrio, 2014; Strömberg, 2015).
Nevertheless, so far most of the empirical research have focused on the media eﬀect
in countries with the most consolidated democracies (e.g. the USA and Scandinavian
countries) and some authoritarian countries (e.g. Russia and East Germany). As Sob-
brio (2014) claims, additional academic contributions are needed to provide empirical
evidence on the eﬀects of media in less explored institutional settings. The Spanish
political context characterized by a long-standing separatist conﬂict amongst some of
its regions turns out to be an interesting and newfangled case study to analyze the
eﬀect of a sub-national media on political outcomes, which ultimately might have con-
sequences on whole country. In particular, the case of Catalonia where TV3 might favor
nationalist and separatist political agendas.
Although we still do not have precise measures of media bias such as those proposed
by Groseclose and Milyo (2005); Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) and Puglisi and Snyder
(2012), anecdotal evidence suggests that in recent years TV3 has shown a Catalan
2
nationalist and separatist bias, which has apparently favored the Catalan nationalist
coalition Convergència i Unió (CiU) and poorly aﬀected opposite standpoints. For
instance, on January 8, 2014, The Wall Street Journal in an article entitled Catalan
TV Network Reﬂects Separatist Fervor by David Román, summarizes the criticisms of
TV3 regarding the alleged separatist bias. The article starts oﬀ with strong opinions like
If you are a thug, a prostitute or a lowlife in a show aired on the Catalan-language TV3
network, chances are you speak Spanish. And continues with opinions collected from
current employees and former executives like Alfons Quintà, who was TV3's managing
director in the 1980s, who says that Sometimes TV3 is worse than Soviet TV was.
Other leading opinions on the TV3 bias can be readily found in Spanish and Catalan
newspapers by the time of the citizen consultation about the Catalonia independence in
November 9, 2014 (better-known as 9N). For instance, It has been given an oversized
coverage to 9N while the 'case Pujol' hides stated by TV3 Journalist Union (Consejo
Profesional de TV3), referring to the corruption scandal in which Jordi Pujol, one of
the historical leaders of CiU and the channel TV3, was involved in the early 80's related
to the bankruptcy of Banca Catalana, one of the biggest banks in Catalonia by that
time and whose crisis aﬀected thousands of people (Baiges et al., 1985; Ríos, 2015)1.
And No cause should we throw away the impartiality claims the Catalonia Journalist
Union also referring to the alleged oversized coverage of the 9N2.
Given this increasing political tension in which TV3 seems to play a main role, it
raises the question of to what extent voting results in Catalonia can be explained by
the exposure of individuals to TV3. Providing empirical support to this answer on
the last decade political tension in Catalonia is still a challenge, due to the fact that
TV3 covered whole Autonomous Community since the mid 80s, thereby impeding to
sort out the self-selection problem. However, there is the possibility of conducting a
natural experiment, taking advantage of the geographically diﬀerentiated expansion of
1El Diario, August 3, 2014.
2El Economista, September 9, 2014.
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the channel in the early years. Although it is true that the separatist movement has
been more vehement in the last decade, this conﬂict is long-standing and the eﬀect of
TV3 on Catalan politics may be traced back to the early 80s.
Originally, the emergence of the public service broadcasting in the Spanish au-
tonomous communities in the late 70s and early 80s was intended to make the system
of public media in Spain more pluralist. Although after the end of the Francoist dic-
tatorship Spanish Radio and Television (RTVE, the national public media) started
introducing programmes in other sub-national languages like Catalan and Basque, the
cultural and linguistic diversity of other Spanish regions were largely repressed and
neglected for national media (Jones, 2007). Hence, the creation of the Catalan Corpo-
ration of Radio and Television (CCRT)3 in 1983 was aimed to help to restore the social
use of Catalan language, and, albeit there was a consensus amongst most Catalan po-
litical parties as to the need for an autonomous media diﬀerentiated from the Spanish
one, the CiU was the one who mainly undertook this project and has mostly driven the
Corporation since then (Argelaguet, 1999; LoCascio, 2008).
In the light of this facts, it is noteworthy that the TV3 emergence in Catalonia in
1983 precisely coincided with the consolidation of the CiU as the strongest political
force in the region: the number of its votes in the Catalan Parliamentary elections rose
from 754,448 in 1980 to 1,345,513 in 1984, which represents an increase in the vote
share from 27,83% to 46.80% (Table 2). This was so even given the corruption scandals
of Banca Catalana in which Jordi Pujol -the top leader of the CiU- was involved by
the same years, between 1982 and 1984. Other two important political parties, Partit
dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC) and the right-wing Partido Popular (PP), also
presented an increase in the number of votes, especially the latter whose votes almost
quadrupled; however, they are a minority in terms of the vote share.
The coincidence between the emergence of TV3 and strengthening of the CiU is
3In 2007, it changed its name to Catalan Corporation of Audiovisual Media.
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even more salient given the good reception of the channel by population. The Catalan
Corporation of Radio and Television, made up of TV3 and Catalunya Ràdio, meant a
big change for the society. It was the ﬁrst time that population was exposed to a media
system totally spoken in Catalan, which it would have been politically impossible some
years ago under the Francoist dictatorship. However, it could be said that television
rather than radio was the one that apparently meant a greater impact, this is proved by
ﬁgures of media audience. According to Jones (2007, p. 521), the audience of Catalunya
Ràdio was about 249,000 individuals in 1986, whereas the audience of TV3 was about
2,047,000 (34% of the total population of Catalonia), namely almost nine times larger
than the radio audience.
This paper looks into the eﬀect of TV3 on the electoral results of the very early
Catalan Parliamentary elections (1980-1984), which allows us to exploit a natural ex-
periment based on the geographically diﬀerentiated timing in the entry of TV3 during
1983 and 1984. In particular, the political outcomes of interest are voter turnout and
the CiU vote share, and we implement a standard two-periods Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences
(DD) model with Propensity Score Matching (PSM). The identifying assumption is
that such geographically diﬀerentiated timing is unrelated to other factors that inﬂu-
ence political outcomes once we take into account relevant initial conditions of TV3
placement and controls.
In line with most of the empirical literature on political persuasion in other countries,
we found that the introduction of TV3 caused an increase both in the voter turnout
and the CiU vote share in the 1984 Catalan parliamentary elections. Speciﬁcally, we
found that municipalities exposed to TV3 present a higher change both in voter turnout
and the CiU vote share between 1980 and 1984. For the former the eﬀect is about 5.3
percentage points on average, whereas for the latter is about 9.9 percentage points.
These results are robust to several econometric speciﬁcations and two distinct placebo
tests. Furthermore, we found a duration treatment eﬀect of the introduction of TV3:
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those municipalities exposed longer (between 4 and 8 months) present a higher eﬀect in
comparison to those less exposed (less than 4 months). Finally, the persuasion rate of
TV3 on the voter turnout is from 15.15% with the least restrictive measure of exposure
rate (100% of the treated population) to 50.51% with the most restrictive measure
(real audience of 30%). Similarly, the persuasion rate of TV3 on the CiU vote share is
from 27.27% with the least restrictive measure to 90.91% with the most restrictive one.
These persuasion rates are large in comparison to previous studies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Primarily, we shortly survey the
literature on media and political persuasion. Secondly, we review the historical context
and the timing of the entry of TV3 in Catalonia, which allows us to take advantage of a
natural experiment to analyze the causal eﬀect of the TV3 exposure on voting. Thirdly,
we present the available data and explain how we build the treatment variable. Fourthly,
we explain the empirical strategy and the main econometric results. And ﬁnally, we
present some ﬁnal remarks and policy implications.
2 Political Economy of Media
The literature on the political economy of media is growing rapidly and addresses a
wide range of research questions. This paper, in particular, is located on two branches:
Firstly, the literature that attempts to establish whether or not there is an eﬀect of
media on voter turnout, which is related to the insight that better informed individuals
are more likely to turnout. And secondly, this paper is also located on the literature
that seeks to identify the eﬀect of biased media on electoral results of speciﬁc political
parties or particular political views. The review shows that additional academic con-
tributions are needed to provide empirical evidence on the eﬀects of media outside the
most consolidated democracies (the USA and Scandinavian countries) and authoritar-
ian regimes (Russia or East Germany). Until now, the eﬀect of media in other political
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or institutional context has not been explored enough, e.g. the eﬀect of sub-national
media on democratic countries undergoing separatist conﬂicts amongst their regions
such as the case of Catalonia in Spain where TV3 might play a crucial part in fueling
the political tension.
2.1 Media and Voter Turnout
Why could voter turnout be aﬀected by media? The role of media is intrinsically
providing information, thus there are at least three distinct theoretical perspectives
that could explain this relationship. Firstly, the basic Downs (1957) model states
that a voter, in deciding whether or not to vote, calculates the expected utility of
either action and votes if beneﬁts exceed costs. There are various costs associated to
voting, and part of these are related to obtaining information about the candidates and
policies (Geys, 006a, p. 18). Then, it would be expected that the entry of a new media
reduces these costs making voting less expensive. Nevertheless, it is well-known that
this rational view is not enough to explain voter turnout since the beneﬁts of voting are
very close to zero (in part because the probability of aﬀecting the outcome is almost
non-existent). This inconsistency between the theory and the stylised facts on turnout
rates is known as the paradox of (not) voting. Secondly, a Downs complementary
perspective suggests that the decision to vote does not solely lie on a rational choice,
but also individuals can see voting as a civic duty and thus feel morally obliged to do
so (Geys 006a, p. 19; Geys 006b, p. 648). From this perspective, media, especially when
it comes to public media, may enlarge the feeling of civic duty and thus make voting
more feasible (Sørensen, 2015). And thirdly, both decision-theoretical (Matsusaka,
1995) and game-theoretical models (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996, 1997) suggest
that better informed individuals are more likely to turnout. Matsusaka (1995) argues
that the probability of turning out increases with the individual's information level.
The reason is that `the value of changing the election outcome is higher when the voter
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is more conﬁdent that she is voting for the right candidate' Matsusaka (1995, p. 93).
Employing a game-theoretic model, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1997) found that
uninformed voters have an incentive to abstain and  as such  to delegate their vote
to those who are better informed. As informed voters are assumed to vote for what
they see as the best option, uninformed voters are only able to aﬀect the outcome
by voting for the `wrong' candidate. Thereby, uninformed voters are better oﬀ if they
abstain. Nevertheless, as Geys (006a, p. 25) points out, the central problem of the these
information models is that they cannot explain the mere existence of voter turnout
as they assume predisposition to vote to achieve positive turnout levels.
Either way, the empirical evidence brings up a diﬀerent perspective: the eﬀect
depends upon the content of the media, which might lead to either a positive or negative
eﬀect on voter turnout. On the one hand, whether it be radio, newspaper or television,
some empirical studies looking at the link between voters' information levels and turnout
ﬁnd a positive correlation. For instance, Strömberg (2004) shows that a higher share of
households owning a radio in a given county was associated with a 5.5 percent increase
in turnout in the US gubernatorial elections between 1920 and 1930.
A similar positive eﬀect of news media on electoral participation has been found
when it comes to newspapers. Snyder and Strömberg (2010) ﬁnd that a higher level
of congruence between newspapers markets and congressional districts (i.e., share of a
newspaper's readership that lives in a given congressional district) is associated with
a larger number of newspaper articles about the congressmen belonging to the local
congressional district, a higher level of voter information, and a higher level of electoral
participation. Also Gentzkow et al. (2011) show that newspapers have a robust positive
eﬀect on participation in congressional elections. Newspapers entry increases electoral
participation in congressional and presidential elections by 0.3 percent. The eﬀect on
presidential turnout is statistically more signiﬁcant in the period 1869-1928 (i.e., before
the introduction of other news media such as radio and television). Drago et al. (2013)
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look at the impact of changes in the supply of local news provided by diﬀerent types
of newspapers (i.e., local and national newspapers) on a broad range of electoral and
public policy outcomes in a sample of medium-large Italian municipalities (i.e., over
15,000 inhabitants) in the period 1993-2010. Their results show that an expansion in
the supply of local news increases turnout in municipal election by 0.46 percentage
points.
With regards to television, Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel (2010) show that the
availability of Spanish-language local TV news programs leads 27 percent of Hispanic
non-voters to turnout in non-presidential election years. And Sørensen (2015), drawing
on the timing of the introduction of state television in Norway during the 1960s and
1970s, ﬁnds that state television instantly became the main source of information on
national politics (it caused a major shift away from the radio), and it led to an increase
in political interest, which caused comparable increases in voter turnout in the national
and local elections.
On the other hand, some contributions point out that an increase in the supply of
news media may lead to a negative eﬀect on electoral participation due to a crowding-
out eﬀect on the existing (and more informative) media. Gentzkow (2006) analyzes
how the diﬀerent timing of the entry of television in the US counties impacted changes
in the electoral participation. The author shows that television reduced turnout in
electoral years with no presidential elections. Gentzkow also shows that this eﬀect
is quite large, i.e., it accounts for half of the total drop in turnout (in years with
no presidential elections) observed in the US since the 1950s. Moreover, the author
provides convincing evidence that the mechanism leading to the eﬀect is based on
the introduction of television crowding-out the existing news media (i.e., newspapers
and radio) and the consequent decrease in the level of political information of citizens.
George and Waldfogel (2008) looking at the expansion of home delivery of the New York
Times newspaper in one hundred cities in the US. The study shows that this expansion
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lead to a decrease in political participation in congressional elections amongst highly
educated voters. The authors argue that this eﬀect was the consequence of highly
educated voters shifting their consumption from local to national news.
The ambiguous eﬀect of media on voter turnout leads to ask what was the TV3 eﬀect
(if there was) in Catalonia by the 1984 parliamentary election. That is, if given the
media context at that time (TVE, news papers, etc.), TV3 provided more information
which translated into better informed individuals and an increase in the voter turnout,
or instead, it yielded a crowding-out eﬀect.
2.2 Media Bias and Political Persuasion
Theoretically speaking, the existing models of persuasion eﬀects can be divided broadly
into two categories (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2008, p. 81). The ﬁrst captures rational
learning and predicts that exposure to the media may have an impact on beliefs and
voting only in the short-run since voters, sooner or later, are able to ﬁlter out any bias
provided by media. The second channel captures non-rational persuasion and implies
that exposure to the media may aﬀect beliefs and voting also in the long-run. Then,
understanding the media impact on voting behavior is of interest not only for politics,
but also for models of belief updating, and, from a policy perspective, if media bias
modiﬁes voting behavior, deregulation of media markets might have a large impact on
political outcomes.
The general picture emerging from the empirical literature is that media bias has
indeed an eﬀect on political views. For instance, Gerber et al. (2009) randomly selected
three groups of people in a county in Virginia at the time of the 2005 gubernatorial
elections in the U.S. in order to study the eﬀect of biased newspapers on voting. The
ﬁrst group was assigned a free subscription to The Washington Post (a left-leaning
newspaper), the second group received a free subscription to The Washington Times
(a right-leaning newspaper), and the third group did not receive any subscription. The
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authors found little statistically signiﬁcant evidence on the impact of media bias on
knowledge or viewpoints, but they did ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact on self-reported voting.
Regarding television, Albertson and Lawrence (2009) analyzed two ﬁeld experi-
ments in which survey respondents were randomly encouraged to view two Fox News
debates (this channel has been considered as having a Republican bias) on the eve of
the 1996 presidential election in the U.S. The authors found that one of the television
programs aﬀected viewer attitudes, even weeks after it aired, while the second one did
not. DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) take advantage of the entry timing of the Fox
News Channel in local cable markets and consider the impact on voting. They ﬁnd a
positive and sizable eﬀect of the introduction of this channel on the Republican vote
share in the Presidential elections in the U.S. between 1996 and 2000. White et al.
(2005) ﬁnd a great eﬀect of the public television in the Russian parliamentary and
presidential elections of December 1999 and March 2000, which according to authors
was not available for everybody (p. 203). Kern and Hainmueller (2009), drawing on
the uneven availability of West German television in East Germany, in particular in
the Dresden district, analyze whether such television had an eﬀect on the support for
the authoritarian regime in the East. They ﬁnd that West television was taken as a
fashion of entertainment rather than a window toward a distinct model of life that
could undermine the support for the Soviet government in Germany. Enikolopov et al.
(2011) compare electoral outcomes and votes reported by survey respondents during
the 1999 parliamentary elections in Russia for those geographical areas that had access
and had no access to the only national TV channel independent from the government
(NTV). The presence of the independent TV channel decreased the aggregate vote
for the government party by 2.5 percentage points and increased the combined vote for
major opposition parties by 2.1 percentage points. Barone et al. (2012) analyze how
the increase of free-view channels in Italy due to the entry of digital TV between 2008
and 2012 aﬀected the political support for Silvio Berlusconi, who had mostly controlled
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television until that time. The author found that the switch caused a drop in the
Berlusconi's coalition vote share by 5.5 to 7.5 percentage points.
With regards to the case of Catalonia, Hierro (2012, p. 160) draws on a panel data
in order to identify whether TV3 induced changes in national identity from 2004 to
2005 examining whether those who self-identiﬁed as both Spanish and Catalan in 2004
are more likely to self-identify more in one way or another in 2005 -that is, shaping a
clearer national identity- as a result of the exposure to TV3 or TVE. The author does
not ﬁnd any eﬀect of media exposure on national identity, however it is important to
call attention on two points: Firstly, due to that all individuals were able to watch any
channel as they were available almost in the entire Catalonia at that time, the exposure
either to TV3 or TVE is established according to the preferences of individuals to media
broadcasters, therefore this methodological approach introduces a bias. Secondly, the
group of individuals with no clear national identity is likely to be made up of those
who do not care so much about political issues (including national identity); therefore,
regardless of what TV channel they watch, they do not become more Spanish or Catalan
from one year to another.
3 Brief History of the Entry of TV3
As we will document below, although exogenous economic and technical constraints
presumably caused a delay in the timing of TV3 introduction across municipalities, this
did not necessarily change the ordering. In other words, the initial assignation to TV3
is not random. Hence, a potentially important source of endogeneity bias is that initial
conditions are likely to determine TV3's placement. The key identifying assumption is
therefore that the TV3 exposure is unrelated to other factors that inﬂuence political
outcomes (voter turnout and CiU vote share) once we take into account initial conditions
of TV3 placement and relevant controls.
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3.1 CiU Governments and Language Normalization Policies
The political system sets up in 1939 by Francisco Franco was one of the longest-lasting
dictatorships in Western Europe, characterized by limited political pluralism, political
demobilization, and, with regards to communication media, systematic suppression of
the pluralism of information, rigid system of censorship, and denial of freedom of ex-
pression (Gunther et al., 2000, pp. 28-29). In this political context, Catalan identity,
as well as Catalan language as an essential part of it, was heavily repressed. However,
once the dictatorship ended in 1975, there was a transition not only from authoritar-
ianism to democracy, but also from a highly centralized state to autonomous regional
governments that provided a breeding ground for the strengthening of the Catalan
nationalism4.
In the late seventies, while the PSC (Catalan socialist political party associated
to the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, PSOE) dominated the general elections5, the
CiU rose as the ruling party in 1980 in the regional ones6. Since then, this nationalist
coalition has in great extent kept its dominance in the Catalan elections celebrated every
four years, only interrupted by another coalition of three left-wing parties: the Partit
dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC), the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC),
and the Iniciativa per Catalunya-els Verds (ICV) between 2003 and 2010 (Table 2).
Early on, Jordi Pujol, leader of the CiU and president of the Generalitat (Catalan
government) from 1980 until 2003, established as one of his government's priorities the
promotion of Catalan identity (LoCascio, 2008, p. 103), for which the recuperation of
the Catalan language was essential (Argelaguet, 1999; LoCascio, 2008; Woolard and
Gahng, 1990; Miley, 2002). As Pujol (1976, p. 83) claims (Language is) the decisive
4According to Balcells (2013), unlike other areas historically under the inﬂuence of the Catalan
culture like the South of France, Catalan nationalism has been highly persisting in Catalonia due to
the absence of a scholastic revolution in Spain prior to the beginning of the 20th century.
5The general elections aim to choose the members of the Spanish National Congress, which is made
of two chambers: The Congress of Deputies (lower chamber) and Senate (higher chamber).
6The Spanish constitution of 1978 established the regional elections as a part of the political au-
tonomy of each community. The aim of this election is thus to select the members of the autonomous
parliament.
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factor in the integration of the immigrants in Catalonia. It is the most deﬁnitive. A man
who speaks Catalan to his children, is a Catalan through and through (Cited by Hierro,
2012, p. 89). Then by 1982, building on the idea that the Catalan population should
become a single community where Catalan was the usual vehicle of communication,
the CiU promoted two laws that intended to increase the level of knowledge and use of
Catalan in whole Catalonia as soon as possible: the Law on Language Normalization,
that regulates the presence of Catalan in teaching7, and the Law that created the
Catalan Corporation of Radio and Television (Hierro, 2012, p. 90), which it would be
autonomous from the Spanish public broadcaster (RTVE) (Baget, 2003).
Needless to say, the idea of implementing a policy of Catalan language normalization
and the creation of a channel did not only come from the CiU. With some nuances this
aim was also shared by parties from the whole political spectrum in Catalonia, however
the CiU was the one who ultimately led this project. Since then, this nationalist
coalition has mostly driven the Catalan Corporation of Radio and Television and, thus,
the public television broadcaster (TV3) (Table 3). The social impact of TV3 was
apparently strong on Catalan society by that time, not only because the new experience
of watching television in Catalan, but also because the TV supply was basically made of
one national Spanish channel. As Hierro (2012, p. 154) points out, over time TV3 has
been considered to be one of the main instruments for the normalization of the Catalan
language use which has been possible through the representation of a monolingual
culture that contrasts with the bilingual Catalan society. That is so in the extent
that media helps to forge national identity whether it be by means of the Barcelona
F.C. football matches, international TV series dubbed into Catalan (e.g. 'Dallas' was
very successful in TV3 in the 80s), nationally produced ﬁctional series (Castelló, 2009),
advertisement (MacGregor, 2003; O'Donohoe, 1999), or news (Mihelj et al., 2009).
7See Clots-Figueras and Masella (2013) and Woolard and Gahng (1990) about the eﬀect of teaching
in Catalan on the nationalist sentiment.
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3.2 The Timing of the Entry of TV3
The ﬁrst broadcasting of TV3 took place on September 10, 1983, through the Tibid-
abo broadcast center. People living in Catalonia watched some chapters of a famous
American TV serie dubbed into Catalan, a football match, and a Jordi Pujol's message,
the president of the Generalitat and leader of the CiU, about the importance of TV3
as a tool for getting the linguistic normalization. Although CiU wanted to take TV3
to whole Catalonia -and even to other Catalan-speaking regions outside Catalonia- as
soon as possible, the ﬁrst broadcasting just reached out Barcelona (the capital city)
and some surrounding districts, which however represented the most populated areas:
between 64% and 70% of the total population by that time (Baget, 1994, p. 94). Then,
subject to the economic and technical framework that a project of this magnitude faces,
the remainder of Catalonia was gradually covered during the next two years by setting
new broadcasts and transposer centers8. It is important to say that because it was
often diﬃcult to foresee if a main transmitter would provide suitable signal strength in
a particular area, a network of local transposer centers was gradually required to receive
the signals. Thus, plausible exogenous variation in the timing of the entry of TV3 arises
from the fact that the channel was conceived as a national plan for whole Catalonia,
but given the economic and technical framework and the diﬃculties to foresee the pro-
vision of adequate signal, TV3 did not reach out an important part of Catalonia by the
date of the 1984 Catalan parliamentary election, that is the election analyzed in this
article.
Drawing on information provided by Montero (1987) and a variety of newspaper
articles from La Vanguardia from 1983 to 1985 on the TV3 coverage (Table 4 in Annex),
we identify the timing of the entry of TV3 in the municipalities of Catalonia. TV3 set
three important broadcast centers before April 1984, the Catalan parliamentary election
8The network television of TV3 is made of broadcast centers, which are the main broadcasting
centers and cover the most important and populated areas; transposer centers, whose capacity is lower
and aim to cover shadow areas of broadcast centers; and mobile centers, which allow to do direct
broadcasts.
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month: Alpicat on 31st December 1983 to cover the districts of Garrigues, Noguera,
Segarra, Segrià, and Urgell. Rocaborda on 16th January 1984 to cover Alt Empordà,
Baix Empordà, Gironès, and Selva. And La Mussara also on 16th January 1984 to
cover Alt Camp, Baix Camp, and Tarragonès. Furthermore, TV3 set some transposers
centers in order to cover some shadows in these areas.
By April 1984 Parliamentary elections, some important broadcast centers and trans-
poser centers had not yet been installed: Montcaro, which would cover Ribera d'Ebre,
Terra Alta, Baix Ebre, and Montsià in the Tarragona province, and the transposers
center Pic del O'rri i Vaqueira, which would cover the Pirineos area: Val D'Aran, Pal-
lars Sobirà, Pallars Jussà, and Alt Urgell. Moreover, many other transposer centers
were set to cover shadows areas.
To sum up, by April 1984 Parliamentary elections, 67% (635 out of 941) of mu-
nicipalities and 92% of population (or 77% excluding Barcelona) was covered by TV3
(Figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.1: Availability of TV3 in Catalonia in April 1984
Source: Prepared by the author based on Montero (1987) and La Vanguardia (Table 4 in
Annex)
4 Data
4.1 Dependent Variables
The dependent variables in our analysis are the change in voter turnout and the change
in the CiU vote share between the 1980 and 1984 Catalan Parliamentary elections at
municipality level. Voter turnout is deﬁned in this study as the share of population
that has cast its vote with respect to the total number of people registered to vote,
and the CiU vote share is deﬁned as the number of votes for CiU with respect to the
total number of votes. The information source is the Statistical Institute of Catalonia
(Idescat).
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4.2 Treatment Variables
The availability of TV3 in April 1984 is, in the jargon of impact evaluation, the treat-
ment variable of this study. Drawing on the information from Montero (1987) and La
Vanguardia newspaper (Table 4 in Annex) presented in the preceding section (Figure
3.1), we code as 1 whether the municipality was covered by TV3 before April 1984
(month of the 1984 Catalan parliamentary election), and 0 otherwise. Furthermore,
in other to carry out a duration treatment analysis as well as check the validity of
the empirical strategy by including placebo treatments, we also code three treatment
variables more: i) Duration: using just treated municipalities, we code as 1 if the mu-
nicipality i was exposed to TV3 between 4 and 8 months, and 0 if less than 4 months;
ii) First placebo: The availability of TV3 in December 1984; iii) Second placebo: A
fake treatment randomly assigned on the untreated municipalities.
4.3 Controls
Despite that information on social, demographic and economic characteristics of the
Catalan municipalities by that time is scarce, we collect a set of variables from Idescat
both for matching initial conditions that determine TV3 placement and control for time-
variant variables. These are: i) Total population in 1981 and 1984; ii) Share of men
with respect to total population in 1981 and 1984; iii) Share of non-native people with
respect to total population in 1981 and 1986; iv) Share of people who speak Catalan
with respect to total population in 1981 and 1986; v) Share of people that get BUP-
COU9 with respect to total population in 1981 and 1986; vi) Share of people that get a
medium graduate with respect to total population in 1981 and 1986; vii) Share of people
that have a professional diploma with respect to total population in 1981 and 1986; ix)
the distance from municipality i to Barcelona; and x) Financial institutions in 1981 and
9Bachillerato Uniﬁcado Polivalente (BUP) and Curso de Orientación Universitaria (COU) corre-
spond to the four study years previous to higher education, namely the High School in some anglo-saxon
countries.
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1984 in the municipalities. Note that although the analysis in this study focuses on the
elections results from 1980 to 1984, the control variables of total population and share
of men are just available for the period 1981-1984, and variables related to education
and Catalan speaking knowledge are for the years 1981 and 1986. The reasoning of the
inclusion of these co-variates in the econometric analysis is theoretically justiﬁed in the
next section.
Table 5 in the annex includes some summary statistics. As we can see, the vote
share for CiU went from 34% in 1980 to 65% in 1984 in both control and treatment
group, giving the impression that there was not a diﬀerential eﬀect in these two groups
as to electoral results. Voter turnout also rose in this period in the two groups, but a bit
less (about 2% less) in the areas non-exposed to TV3. For the treatment group, voter
turnout rose from 58% to 70%, whereas in the control group from 58% to 68%. With
respect to demographic variables, we see that municipalities exposed to TV3 correspond
to the most populated, 8,703 inhabitants in average in 1980 and 8,815 in 1984, whereas
those non-exposed have 1,550 inhabitants on average in 1980 and 1,567 in 1984. The
share of Catalan speakers presents an outstanding variation in the exposed areas, going
from 88% in 1980 to 97% in 1984, whereas it holds around 90% - 92% in non-exposed
areas. Finally, variables related to education do not present large diﬀerences between
exposed and non-exposed TV3 areas.
5 Empirical Strategy
We consider the impact of the entry of the TV3 channel on two political outcomes
related to electoral results of the Catalan parliamentary elections: the change in voter
turnout and the change in the CiU vote share between 1980 and 1984 at municipality
level. To do so, we resort to a natural experiment based on the geographically diﬀer-
entiated expansion of TV3 in Catalonia. This strategy exploits the timing of the entry
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described in the preceding section. The key identifying assumption is that the TV3 ex-
posure is unrelated to other factors that inﬂuence political outcomes (voter turnout and
CiU vote share) once we take into account relevant initial conditions and time-variant
controls that plausibly determine the assignation to TV3.
In particular, we combine a standard two-periods Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences (DD)
methodology with Propensity Score Matching (PSM) in that it compares the change
over time (ﬁrst diﬀerence) for the municipalities exposed to TV3 channel versus those
comparable non-exposed used as a control group (second diﬀerence). In particular,
the DD strategy can be summarized in the following table 1.
Table 1: Empirical Strategy: Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences
Municipalities T
(TV3)
Municipalities
NT (No TV3)
Causal Eﬀect
Period 1
(Before entry
of TV3)
yT1 y
NT
1
Period 2
(After entry of
TV3)
yT2 y
NT
2
A = yT2 − yT1 B = yNT2 − yNT1 A−B
Column 1 in Table 2 shows that the diﬀerence between yT2 and y
T
1 captures the eﬀect
of TV3 on the outcome variable plus any other eﬀect. Also, column 2 displays that
the diﬀerence between yNT2 and y
NT
1 captures any other eﬀect than TV3. Thus, the
diﬀerence of these two diﬀerences (Column 3) captures just the eﬀect of TV3 on the
outcome variable, that is the causal eﬀect.
Nevertheless, inasmuch as the assignation to TV3 was not random, a potentially
important source of endogeneity arises when initial conditions of municipalities are likely
to determine TV3 placement and inﬂuence the subsequent electoral results. This does
not make plausible to hold the parallel trend assumption; that is, the assumption that
in the absence of the intervention, both treated and non-treated populations would have
shared the same trends on the outcomes of interest. So, we cannot estimate accurately
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the impact of TV3 by simply comparing areas that experienced this channel and those
that did not.
To address these concerns we combine the DD estimator with PSM, as proposed by
Heckman et al. (1997). The estimated probability of participation (or propensity score)
can be used to match participant and control units in the base (pre-program) year,
and the treatment impact is calculated across participant and matched control units
within the common support (Khandker et al., 2010, p. 80). Then, in order to obtain
the propensity scores needed to deﬁne the common support and match municipalities,
we ﬁrst implement a Logit model of the availability of TV3 as follows:
TV 3i,April1984 = β0 + β1Xi,1980 + β2Xi,1981 + εi (5.1)
Where the dependent variable TV 3i,April1984 is the availability of TV3 in municipal-
ity i by April 1983. Xi,1980 and Xi,1981 are a set of initial conditions (some for 1980 and
others for 1981 given the availability of information) that might aﬀect the TV3 place-
ment as well as the subsequent trajectories of municipalities' political outcomes. For
Xi,1980, these are: i) voter turnout in 1980, ii) CiU vote share in 1980, and for Xi,1981,
iii) Log of total population in 1981, iv) Share of men with respect to total population
in 1981, v) Share of non-native people with respect to total population in 1981, vi)
Share of people who speak Catalan with respect to total population in 1981, vii) Share
of people that get BUP-COU with respect to total population in 1981, viii) Share of
people that get a mid graduate with respect to total population in 1981, ix) Share of
people that have a professional diploma with respect to total population in 1981, and
x) Financial institutions in 1981 10. The standard errors are clustered at district level.
The inclusion of both the previous voter turnout and the CiU vote share is justiﬁed
as voting may be habit-forming, namely individuals who voted in the past are more
10Although the distance from municipality i to Barcelona might aﬀect turnout and political views,
we rule it out as it badly aﬀect the balancing test, that is does not perform well to make comparable
groups. Furthermore, it is deleted in the DD strategy since is a time-invariant variable.
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likely to vote again in future elections and for similar political agendas (Geys, 006b, p.
646). The inclusion of population size is also suggested by the probability of casting the
decisive vote in the election (i.e. making or breaking a tie). The share of men is included
to control for possible diﬀerences in political participation related to sex. The share of
non-native people and Catalan speakers can also have a eﬀect on electoral outcomes
due to diﬀerences on political views related to individuals' origin. Educational variables
can also inﬂuence the electoral participation in the extent that more sophisticated
individuals are more likely to turnout. And ﬁnally, the presence of ﬁnancial institutions
(banks or saving banks) in the municipalities is intended to capture two things: First,
it is a measure of how modern the municipality economy is, and second, it measures
some kind of overlapped interest since Banca Catalana, the biggest bank by that time,
was owned by Jordi Pujol, the top of the CiU.
Based on the estimated propensity scores obtained from the previous analysis, with
panel data over two time periods t = {1, 2}, the average treatment eﬀect on the treated
(ATT) in the common support is given by (Khandker et al., 2010, p. 61):
ATT =
1
NT
[∑
iT
(
yTi,2 − yTi,1
)−∑
jNT
W (i, j)
(
yNTj,2 − yNTj,1
)]
(5.2)
Where T and NT denote exposure to TV3 (treatment) and no exposure to TV3
(control) respectively, yT2,i− yT1,i is the change in the outcome measure for municipalityi
exposed to TV3, yNT2,i −yNT1,i is the change in the outcome measure for control municipal-
ity j, NT represents the size of the treatment group, and W (i, j) represents the weights
assigned to each control municipality j, which depends on the particular matching es-
timator employed. We use a kernel matching as it has more advantages than other
matching methods. In particular, it uses a weighted average of all untreated observa-
tions in order to construct the counterfactual match for each treated so that it gives
more weight to those control municipalities that are closer matches and less weight to
farthest observations. Also, Kernel matching reduces the estimation variance insofar as
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it uses more observations than other matching algorithms.
Speciﬁcally, the weights are obtained by the following function (Khandker et al.,
2010, p. 60):
W (i, j) =
K
[
pj−pi
an
]
∑
kNT
K
[
pk − pi
an
] (5.3)
whereK(·) is a kernel function, an is a bandwidth parameter, and pi is the estimated
propensity score of the treated municipalities. pj and pk are the estimated propensity
scores of municipalities in the control group.
Although combining DD and PSM has advantages such as reducing the self-selection
bias by matching comparable treatment and control areas as well as removing time
invariant unobserved characteristics that might aﬀect outcomes, the estimator could
still be biased if there are any time variant observed characteristics that aﬀect the
outcomes over time. For instance, if social-demographic characteristic like the total
population or the average education years change diﬀerently for treated and control
groups in the period of analysis, this would aﬀect the parallel trend assumption. To
reduce the risk of such a bias, we control for the change in the co-variates used to
match on initial conditions since they might vary over time and inﬂuence the political
outcomes.
In terms of a regression framework, we estimate a weighted least squares regression
by means of a ﬁrst-diﬀerence equation as follows.
∆Yi,t(Wi) = β1TV 3i,April1984 + β2∆Xi,t + β3Banksi,1984 + νj + ηp + εi,t (5.4)
Where ∆Yi,t is the change between 1980 and 1984 in the political outcomes of inter-
est, that is the voter turnout and the CiU vote share for municipality i. TV 3i,April1984 is
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the availability of TV3 in the municipality i in April 1984, thus the regression coeﬃcient
β1 measures the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator. ∆Xi,t is the change between 1980
and 1984 for time-variant controls. These are: i) Log of total population, ii) Share of
men with respect to total population, iii) Share of non-native people with respect to
total population, iv) Share of people who speak Catalan with respect to total popula-
tion, v) Share of people that get BUP-COU with respect to total population, vi) Share
of people that get a mid graduate with respect to total population, and vii) Share of
people that have a professional diploma with respect to total population. Banksi,1984
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if there were ﬁnancial institutions in the
municipality i in 1984 and 0 otherwise. This co-variate measures the exposure of the
municipalities to the ﬁnancial system, and is intended to capture if there was an eﬀect
of the ﬁnancial crisis caused by the bankruptcy of Banca Catalana since, as previously
documented, the leader of the CiU owned this bank. Finally, νj are ﬁxed eﬀects at dis-
trict j, ηp are ﬁxed eﬀects at province p, and εi,t is the disturbance term. The standard
errors are clustered robust at the district level for all econometric speciﬁcations except
when including district ﬁxed eﬀects, in this case the standard errors are just robust.
Another source of endogeneity for omitted time-variant variables might come from
the eﬀect of other media such as radio or newspapers that came out over the same
period of time. Nevertheless, scarce information does not allow yet to control for the
coverage of other type of media in the municipalities.
Regarding radio, however, the concern can be minimized given the higher audience
of TV3 in comparison to Catalunya Ràdio. As mentioned in the introduction, the
Catalan Corporation of Radio and Television was initially made up of one television
channel (TV3) and one radio station (Catalunya Ràdio). However, it was TV3 the
media who apparently had a greater impact in Catalan society by that time, this is
evident for instance through the ﬁgures about media audience. According to Jones
(2007, p. 521), the audience of Catalunya Ràdio reached out 249,000 individuals in
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1986 (4% of the total population of Catalonia), whereas TV3 was about 2,047,000
(34% of the total population), that is almost nine times larger than the radio audience.
With regards to newspapers, we still do not count with ﬁgures about subscribers at
municipality level, then we do not know the geographical diﬀerences in the number of
readers. These diﬀerences could aﬀect the political outcomes so that the results of the
eﬀect of TV3 might be biased, future research therefore should be focused on looking
into the eﬀect of newspapers. Some important newspapers available by the time that
TV3 was created are Avui, Diari de Barcelona, La Vanguardia and El Periódico. Avui
came out in April 1976 and circulated until July 2011. This was the ﬁrst newspaper
with an independence political ideology written in Catalan after the end of the Francoist
regime. The Diari de Barcelona, one of the oldest newspapers in Europa (founded in
1792), was written both in Spanish and Catalan between 1982 and 1984, when it was
closed for one year until it was acquired by the Barcelona government. And the two
main newspapers today in Catalonia are La Vanguardia y El Periódico, the former was
founded in 1881 and started to be written in Catalan since 2011, and the latter was
founded in 1978 and presented its ﬁrst Catalan version in 1997.
6 Results
6.1 Propensity Score Matching
Firstly, we estimate the propensity scores of areas exposed and not exposed to TV3 using
a Logit model. In this model we include co-variates as initial contidions that jointly
inﬂuence the likelihood of treatment and outcomes. Following the literature on political
participation and given the availability of information, these baseline characteristics are:
i) Voter turnout in 1980, ii) the CiU vote share in 1980, iii) Log of total population in
1981, iv) Share of men with respect to total population in 1981, v) Share of non-native
people with respect to total population in 1981, vi) Share of people who speak Catalan
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with respect to total population in 1981, vii) Share of people that get BUP-COU with
respect to total population in 1981, viii) Share of people that get a mid graduate
with respect to total population in 1981, ix) Share of people that have a professional
diploma with respect to total population in 1981, and x) Financial institutions in the
municipality i in 1981.
Table 6 displays the results from the marginal eﬀects of the Logit regression. It is
noteworthy that those municipalities with larger population and presence of banks are
more likely to be exposed to TV3. We estimate the scores ensuring they satisfy the
balancing property within the region of common support, which is built by dropping
treatment observations whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less
than the minimum propensity score of the controls. 30 treated municipalities are oﬀ
the common support, whilst no control municipality is oﬀ (Table 8). Then, we match
the treatment and control areas using the default Stata Software speciﬁcations, namely
Epanechnikov kernel matching with a bandwith of 0.06.
Table 7 shows the balancing test for co-variates used to estimate propensity scores.
It displays the mean diﬀerences for the treatment and control groups before and after
being matched. As we see, there was a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in six co-variates between
those municipalities exposed to TV3 and those not exposed before matching, which
aﬀects the comparability of the two groups. These are: the log of total population,
share of men, share of non-native from Catalonia, share of Catalan speakers, share of
people with a mid graduate, and share of people with higher education. Once matched,
these statistical diﬀerences on the average value no longer exist, the treatment and
control groups are then more comparable in terms of the co-variates included in the
PSM. Then, we move on to apply the DD model with the weights W (i, j) assigned to
each control municipality j arising from the kernel matching method.
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6.2 The Eﬀect of TV3 on Political Outcomes
Table 10 displays the results for the change in voter turnout, and table 11 for the change
in the CiU vote share. We found evidence that the TV3 entry caused an increase both
in voter turnout and the CiU vote share in the 1984 Catalan parliamentary election.
These results are robust to several econometric speciﬁcations including district and
province ﬁxed eﬀects as well as two distinct placebo tests.
With regards to voter turnout (Table 10), municipalities exposed to TV3 present a
higher change in voter turnout between 1980 and 1984. All the econometric speciﬁca-
tions are statistically signiﬁcant as to the variable Availability of TV3 in April 1984. We
ﬁrst implement a simple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence model and estimate the equation 5.2
without controls, the eﬀect is about 10.5 percentage points (Column 1). In column 2
we add control variables and ﬁnd that the eﬀect is about 3.8 percentage points, and the
R2 raises from 0.20 to 0.36. When including district ﬁxed eﬀects (Column 3), the eﬀect
is about 7.8 percentage points and the R2 increases until 0.47. Finally, with province
ﬁxed eﬀects (Column 4), the eﬀect is about 3.1 percentage points and the R2 is 0.37.
Then, it can be said that the eﬀect of TV3 on voter turnout is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant. On average, including just the estimations with controls and ﬁxed eﬀects,
the eﬀect is about 4.9 percentage points.
In addition to favoring the increase in voter turnout, TV3 also seemingly favored
the increase in the CiU vote share (Table 11). All the econometric speciﬁcation are
statistically signiﬁcant. With no controls, the eﬀect is about 31 percentage points
(Column 1). When including control variables (Column 2), the eﬀect is about 13.6
percentage points, and the R2 raises from 0.41 to 0.65. With ﬁxed eﬀects at district
level (Column 3) the eﬀect falls until 6.6 percentage points and the R2 is 0.81. And
with province ﬁxed eﬀects (Column 4), the eﬀect is about 9.6 percentage points and
the R2 is 0.73. Then, it can be concluded that the eﬀect of TV3 on the CiU vote share
is statistically signiﬁcant and is on average 9.9 percentage points.
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On the other hand, it is noteworthy that some co-variates have a signiﬁcant inﬂu-
ence in all econometric speciﬁcations. In particular, regarding voter turnout there is
a negative eﬀect of the change in the total population on the electoral participation;
that is to say, those municipalities who present a larger increase in the total population
present lower turnout. The eﬀect is about 16 percentage points on average. On the
contrary, there is a positive inﬂuence of the change in the share of non-native popula-
tion on voter turnout, that is those municipalities that present a larger increase in the
share of non-native population go out to vote in a greater extent. And there is also a
positive eﬀect of the banks presence in the municipalities, that is those municipalities
more exposed to the Catalan ﬁnancial system go out to vote in a greater extent as well.
Regarding the CiU vote share, there is also a positive eﬀect of the change in the
share of non-native population on the vote share of this Catalan nationalist coalition,
which could turn out to be counter-intuitive since one would expect that municipalities
with more Catalan natives to go out to vote in a greater extent for the CiU. And more
interestingly, there is a positive impact of the presence of banks in the municipalities.
That is, in spite of the corruption scandal related to the bankruptcy of Banca Catalana,
those municipalities more exposed to the ﬁnancial system cast its vote for CiU. This
can be explained by how people perceived the nature of such scandal. Seemingly, it was
seen as an attack of the Spanish government against the interests of Catalonia and CiU
causing a greater support for this nationalist coalition instead of reducing the intention
to vote for it (Baiges et al., 1985; Ríos, 2015).
6.3 Placebo Tests
We use two placebo tests to assess the robustness of our ﬁndings. The ﬁrst placebo
treatment is a lead that uses data on TV3 diﬀusion between April and December
1984 (i.e. eight months later than the initial treatment variable). In April 1984, 613
municipalities were treated and 323 untreated, which are the size of our main treatment
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and control groups. To December 1984, TV3 had reached out 163 municipalities more;
that is, 776 were treated and 164 untreated. If the exposure to TV3 is indeed causing
the eﬀects in the outcome, then the lead should not be signiﬁcant (otherwise they will
capture anticipatory eﬀects or pre-existing trends).
Columns 1 and 2 of the tables 12 and 13 display the results of that placebo test. The
results show that the lead, Availability of TV3 in December 1984 (Column 1), is not
signiﬁcant neither for the change in the voter turnout nor the CiU vote share. Further,
by including the Availability of TV3 in April 1984 (Column 2), the placebo remains no
signiﬁcant while the latter turns out to be signiﬁcant. These results give support to the
idea that there are not pre-existing trends in the DD model, thus the outcome trends
are plausibly parallel.
The second placebo randomly assigns the area used as control group to a fake
placebo treatment. We produce this random placebo treatment in order to stay with
the same ratio of areas in the control and placebo treated as the one found between our
treated and control areas, namely 65.64% of treated with respect to the total number of
municipalities, that means 211 treated and 110 untreated. And similarly, a DD strategy
is combined with PSM in order to have more comparable groups. Once obtained the
propensity scores, two treated municipalities are oﬀ the common support, then in sum
we count on 209 treated and 110 untreated.
Column 3 of the tables 12 and 13 shows the results of the fake placebo treatment test.
As we can see, the fake treatment has no eﬀect on the political outcomes neither for the
change in the voter turnout nor the CiU vote share. In line with the previous placebo
test, these results also contribute to support the idea that there are not pre-existing
trends in the DD model.
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6.4 Duration Treatment Eﬀect
In addition to estimating the eﬀect of TV3 on those municipalities exposed to the
channel, we also analyze the duration of the treatment. That is to say, the diﬀerence in
the eﬀect of the exposure to TV3 according to how long the municipalities have been
exposed. Eight months passed since TV3 began the transmissions until the Catalan
parliament elections in April 1984, but not all treated municipalities were assigned to
have TV3 at the same time. We then split the treatment group in two: those who
received TV3 for a period between 4 and 8 months and those who received it for less
than 4 months. The ﬁgure 6.1 summarizes the geographically distinct intensities of the
exposure to TV3.
Figure 6.1: Availability of TV3 diﬀerentiated by duration in Catalonia by April 1984
Source: Prepared by the author based on Montero (1987) and La Vanguardia (Table 4 in
Annex)
When reducing the sample to those municipalities exposed to TV3 in April 1984,
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we have 235 municipalities treated between 4 and 8 months, and 378 municipalities
treated for less than 4 months. Similarly, we combine a DD strategy with PSM in order
to have more comparable groups. Then, once obtained the propensity scores 5 treated
municipalities are oﬀ the common support, thus we ﬁnally count on 230 treated and
378 untreated.
As we can see in the econometric results presented in tables 14 and 15, the change
both in voter turnout and the CiU vote share are higher on those municipalities treated
longer. i.e, there is a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence related to the duration of the
exposure, and these results are robust to all the econometric speciﬁcations.
Regarding voter turnout (Table 14), without controlling for any variable (Column
1), the eﬀect is about 16.7 percentage points and the R2 is 0.23. Including control
variables (Column 2), the eﬀect is 4.6 percentage points and the R2 raises to 0.48.
When including district ﬁxed eﬀects (Column 3), the coeﬃcient gives an eﬀect of 34.8
percentage points and the R2 goes up to 0.52. And with province ﬁxed eﬀects (Column
4), the impact is about 5.1 percentage points and the R2 is about 0.49.
Also, there is a duration treatment eﬀect on the CiU vote share (Table 15). With
no controls (Column 1), the eﬀect is about 30 percentage points and the R2 is 0.42.
Including control variables (Column 2), the eﬀect is 9.2 percentage points and the R2
raises to 0.73. When including district ﬁxed eﬀects (Column 3), the coeﬃcient is 17.7
percentage points and the R2is 0.80. And ﬁnally with province ﬁxed eﬀects (Column
4), the impact is about 16.1 percentage points and the R2 is 0.78.
6.5 Persuasion Rates
According to DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010), wherever possible is important to report
results in terms of the persuasion rate. This is a measure of the percentage of receivers
that change the behavior amongst those that receive a message and are not already
persuaded. The persuasion rate is deﬁned as follows:
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f = 100 ∗ yT − yC
eT − eC
1
(1− y0) (6.1)
where ei is the share of group i receiving the message, yi is the share of group i
adopting the behavior of interest, and y0 is the share that would adopt if there were no
message. Due to that y0 is not observed, we can approximate it by yc, the turnout in
the control group, as long as the exposure to TV3 of the control groups is zero (eC = 0),
which is the case in this study11.
The persuasion rate captures the eﬀect of the persuasion treatment on the relevant
behavior (yT − yC), which is the estimated eﬀect of the change in the political outcomes
βˆ1, adjusting for exposure to the message (eT − eC) and for the size of the population
left to be convinced (1− y0).
For the case of voter turnout, the value of (yT − yC) is on average 0.05 (taking
the average of βˆ′1s estimated with controls and ﬁxed eﬀects). Due to the fact that
y0 ≈ yC , then y0 = 0.68, which is the turnout in the control group in the 1984 Catalan
Parliamentary election. And the exposure rate can be (eT − eC) = (34%− 0) if we
follow the ﬁgures about TV3 audience provided by Jones (2007) for 1986 and we assume
that this audience is very similar in 1984 and eC = 0. Using the equation 6.1, the
persuasion rate of TV3 on voter turnout in the 1984 Catalan parliamentary election is
about 46%. It can be said that about 46% of those who were not already persuaded
in the treated population changed their behavior and went out to vote in due to the
inﬂuence of TV3.
For the case of the CiU vote share, the value of (yT − yC) is 0.09 and y0 = 0.65, which
is the CiU vote share in the control group in the 1984 Catalan Parliamentary election
11DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010, p. 5) provides a demostration of such approximation. Assuming
random exposure and a constant persuasion rate f , the share in group i who adopt the behavior is
yi = y0 + eif (1− y0). Rearranging this expression gives equation (6.1). Solving the system for y0,
it can be obtained y0 = yC − eC (yT − yC) (eT − eC). The approximation y0 = yC is valid as long
as the exposure rate in the control group is small (eC ≈ 0) or the eﬀect of the treatment is small
(yT − y0 ≈ 0).
32
and we assume the same TV3 audience. Using the equation 6.1, the persuasion rate of
TV3 on the CiU vote share in the 1984 Catalan parliamentary election is about 75.6%.
It can be said therefore that about 75.6% of those who were not already persuaded in
the treated population changed their behavior and decided to go out to vote for CiU
due to the exposure to TV3.
Persuasion Rates in the Literature: How large is the persuasion rate? DellaV-
igna and Kaplan (2007) and DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010) provide a summary of
the persuasion rates obtained by diﬀerent salient studies. According to DellaVigna and
Kaplan (2007), regarding voter turnout, the ﬁeld experiment carried out by Gerber and
Green (2000) (Canvassing, Telephone Calls and Direct Mail) presents the largest per-
suasion rate: 26.30%, also Green and Gerber (2001) (Phone call or face-to-face contact)
with 20.50%. With regards to the eﬀect of biased media on voting behavior, DellaVi-
gna and Kaplan (2007) (FOX News) presents a persuasion rate of 11.60%; Enikolopov
et al. (2011) (Non-governmental TV), 10.20%; and Gerber et al. (2009) (Washington
Post), 20%. Then, it can be regarded that the persuasion rate of TV3 both on the
voter turnout and the CiU vote share of the 1984 Catalan parliamentary election is
comparatively larger with respect to other case studies.
7 Final Remarks
This paper studies the impact of media on voting. We consider one of the most im-
portant changes in the Catalan media system in the last decades, the introduction and
expansion of TV3 between 1983 and 1984. We resort to a natural experiment induced
by the timing of the entry of TV3 in the Catalan territory in order to identify the eﬀect
of this channel on the voter turnout and the vote share of the nationalist coalition CiU,
who has mainly driven the channel since then, in the 1984 parliamentary election.
The main conclusion arising from this study is that TV3 caused an increase in the
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voter turnout as well as favored the CiU vote share in the 1984 Catalan parliamentary
election. Thus, this study contributes to the discussion on the media eﬀect on electoral
outcomes using Catalonia as a case study.
Regarding voter turnout, unlike some studies like Gentzkow (2006) ﬁnds a negative
eﬀect of TV on voter turnout as a result of a crowding-out eﬀect, it can be said that
TV3, instead of reducing the level of political information, actually complemented the
information provided by the traditional media by that time such as TVE, newspapers
and radio and make more individuals go out to vote. This ﬁnding is congruent with
other studies surveyed above (Strömberg, 2004; Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel, 2010;
Snyder and Strömberg, 2010; Gentzkow et al., 2011; Drago et al., 2013), which defend
the insight that media promote electoral participation by making better informed in-
dividuals. Thus, TV3 indeed boosted an increase in electoral participation in the 1984
Catalan parliamentary election.
With respect to the CiU vote share, the TV3 eﬀect is in line with most of the
related literature on political persuasion (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Gerber et al.,
2009; DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010; Enikolopov et al., 2011; Hierro, 2012).We found
evidence that the increase in the CiU vote share -the political party who created and
has mostly driven this channel since then- by that time was a phenomenon attributable
to TV3. As mentioned in the introduction, providing empirical support on the eﬀect of
TV3 on the political tension of the last decade in Catalonia is still a challenge. However,
this paper showed that the eﬀect of TV3 can be traced back to the early 80s when the
channel was initially settled.
Further, we found that the duration of the exposure is also signiﬁcant. i.e. those
municipalities exposed longer (between 4 and 8 months) present a higher eﬀect both
in the voter turnout and the CiU vote share in comparison to those less exposed (less
than 4 months).
Finally, the persuasion rate, which is a measure of the percentage of individuals
34
that change the behavior amongst those that receive a message and are not already
persuaded, on the voter turnout is about 46%, and the persuasion rate on the CiU vote
share is about 75.6%. In comparison to other case studies, these persuasion rates are
quite large which makes evident the important role of TV3 in the early 80's Catalan
politics.
Many questions are still opened for future research. Firstly, what and how large is
the actual bias of TV3 today? Secondly, has TV3 favored the CiU vote share in more
recent years? And thirdly, has TV3 fueled citizen mobilizations in favour of separatism
in Catalonia? Further, another topic of great signiﬁcance is the role of competition.
The insight that competition amongst media can limit the scope of persuasion has
important implications for regulation and public policy, but it has not been explored
enough yet. Does TV3 still have an inﬂuence on political attitudes in the context of a
wider range of media today (TV, radio and internet)? Providing a convincing answer
to these questions will help us to understand to a greater extent the role of media in
the Catalan politics today.
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Annex
Table 2: Results of Regional Elections in Catalonia (Vote share in parenthesis)
Year CiU PSC PP IC ERC C's CUP Others Total Elected President
1980 754,448
(28.00)
608,689
(22.59)
64,119
(2.38)
509,014
(18.89)
241,711
(8.97)
- - 516,005
(19.15)
2,693,986 Jordi Pujol (CiU)
1984 1,345,513
(47.01)
865,449
(30.24)
221,697
(7.75)
160,586
(5.61)
126,865
(4.43)
- - 142,011
(4.96)
2,862,121 Jordi Pujol (CiU)
1988 1,230,356
(46.03)
800,999
(29.96)
143,062
(5.35)
208,689
(7.81)
111,276
(4.16)
- - 178,741
(6.69)
2,673,123 Jordi Pujol (CiU)
1992 1,218,.831
(46.77)
726,099
(27.86)
157,395
(6.04)
171,455
(6.58)
209,881
(8.05)
- - 122,320
(0.47)
2,605,981 Jordi Pujol (CiU)
1995 1,314,548
(41.36)
797,422
(25.09)
420,341
(13.23)
312,371
(9.83)
304,833
(9.59)
- - 28,720
(0.09)
3,178,235 Jordi Pujol (CiU)
1999 1,172,721
(38.05)
1,177,777
(38.22)
295,765
(9.60)
78,213
(2.54)
270,176
(8.77)
- - 87,084
(2.83)
3,081,736 Jordi Pujol (CiU)
2003 1,018,164
(31.22)
1,026,396
(31.47)
390,882
(11.98)
240,235
(7.37)
542,046
(16.62)
- - 44,018
(1.35)
3,261,741 Pasqual Maragall (PSC)
2006 928,936
(32.19)
789,956
(27.37)
313,368
(10.86)
281,405
(9.75)
414,044
(14.35)
89,544
(3.10)
- 68,640
(0.24)
2,885,893 José Montilla (PSC)
2010 1,198,193
(39.66)
570,405
(18.88)
384,470
(1.27)
229,853
(7.61)
218,152
(7.22)
105,884
(3.50)
- 314,503
(10.41)
3,021,460 Artur Mas ( CiU)
2012 1,112,605
(31.14)
523,537
(14.65)
470,759
(13.18)
358,860
(1.00)
496,466
(13.90)
274,652
(7.69)
126,198
(3.53)
209,729
(5.87)
3,572,806 Artur Mas ( CiU )
Source: Idescat
41
Table 3: Directors of Catalan Broadcasting Corporation
Director Years Political Party
Pere Cuxart Bartolí 1983-1984 CiU
Josep Caminal Bahía 1984 CiU
Joan Granados Llevarán 1984-1995 CiU
Jordi Vilajoana 1995-1999 CiU
Luis Oliva Vázquez de Novoa 1999-2000 CiU
Miquel Puig Raposo 2000-2002 CiU
Vicenç Villatoro 2002-2004 CiU
Joan Majó Cruzate 2004-2008 PSC
Albert Sàez Casas 2008-2010 ERC
Enric Marín Otto 2010-2012 ERC
Brauli Duart Llinares 2012-presente CiU
Source: Corporación Catalana de Medios Audiovisuales
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Table 4: Information on TV3 coverage from newspaper La Vanguardia
Date Page Article
Monday, January 02, 1984 42 TV Catalana 1983: un año de grandes esperanzas
Friday, January 06 1984 19 TV3 llegó a las comarcas de Lleida
Friday, January 13 1984 25 El repetidor de TV3 en Rocacorba no cubrirá todas las comarcas de Girona
Thursday, April 05 1984 23 Los hoteleros de la Vall d'Aran se quejan de las anomalías de TV
Saturday, April 07 1984 6 Las islas Baleares quieren conectar con TV3
Thursday, June 13 1985 29 TVE y TV3 estudian la cobertura del Pallars Sobira y la Vall d'Aran
Wednesday, June 26 1985 23 A partir de septiembre, TV3 se captará en buenas condiciones en toda la zona del Pirineo
Saturday, July 27 1985 19 La po1ítca de reemisores de TV3 perjudica los acuerdos con TVE, según Calviño
Saturday, July 27 1985 40 Calviño inauguró ayer un centro emisor en el Pirineo leridano
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Table 5: Summary Statistics
Variables All Munici-
palities
TV3 in
April 1984
No TV3 in
April 1984
Diﬀerence Variables All Munici-
palities
TV3 in
April 1984
No TV3 in
April 1984
Diﬀerence
CiU Vote Share 1980 0.338
(0.187)
0.341
(0.190)
0.330
(0.181)
0.010 Share Non-Native
Catalan 1981
0.152
(0.126)
.169 (.135) 0.118
(0.099)
0.056***
CiU Vote Share 1984 0.648
(0.158)
0.645
(0.151)
0.653
(0.172)
-0.008 Share Non-Native
Catalan 1986
0.229
(0.163)
0.253
(0.172)
0.183
(0.130)
0.077***
Voter Turnout 1980 0.582
(0.171)
0.577
(0.185)
0.592
(0.137)
-0.008 Share BUP COU 1981 0.038
(0.024)
0.038
(0.022)
0.037
(0.027)
0.002
Voter Turnout 1984 0.691
(0.088)
0.697
(0.078)
0.681
(0.100)
0.019** Share BUP COU 1986 0.044
(0.022)
0.045
(0.023)
0.041
(0.022)
0.006**
Total Population 1981 6,370
(59,971)
8,878
(73,929)
1,595
(3,071)
7,145* Share Mid Graduate
1981
0.016
(0.017)
0.016
(0.018)
0.014
(0.013)
0.002*
Total Population 1984 6,465
(60,376)
9,000
(74,384)
1,621
(3,085)
7,244* Share Mid Graduate
1986
0.018
(0.013)
0.019
(0.013)
0.016
(0.013)
0.003**
Log Total Population
1981
6.807
(1.560)
6.984
(1.644)
6.468
(1.324)
0.588*** Share Superior 1981 0.014
(0.014)
0.015
(0.012)
0.012
(0.016)
0.002**
Log Total Population
1984
6.828
(1.567)
7.013
(1.649)
6.476
(1.331)
0.610*** Share Superior 1986 0.018
(0.013)
0.018
(0.014)
0.017
(0.013)
0.001*
Share Men 1981 0.505
(0.024)
0.503
(0.020)
0.509
(0.028)
-0.006*** Distance to Barcelona
(Km)
4,781
(3,112)
4,283
(2,906)
5,736
(3,287)
-1,523***
Share Men 1984 0.505
(0.026)
0.503
(0.023)
0.509
(0.030)
-0.006** Log Distance to
Barcelona
8.105
(1.084)
7.959
(1.139)
8.385
(0.907)
-0.450***
Share Catalan
Speakers 1981
0.888
(0.122)
0.883
(0.110)
0.903
(0.137)
-0.022** Banks 1981 0.465
(0.499)
0.484
(0.500)
0.429
(0.495)
0.054
Share Catalan
Speakers 1986
0.954
(0.179)
0.964
(0.138)
0.929
(0.115)
0.037*** Banks 1984 0.496
(0.500)
0.517
(0.500)
0.459
(0.499)
0.057*
Total Observations 941 635 306
Source: Idescat. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 6: Logit Model of the Availability of TV3 in April 1984
Co-variates
Marginal
Eﬀects
Voter Turnout 1980
0.412
(1.028)
CiU Vote Share 1980
1.879
(1.144)
Log Total Population 1981
0.363**
(.178)
Share of Men 1981
-7.895*
(4.083)
Share of Non-native 1981
3.533
(2.307)
Share of Catalan Speakers 1981
0.081
(0.878)
Share of BUP COU 1981
-2.246
(4.681)
Share of Mid Graduate 1981
4.485
(5.476)
Share of Professional Diploma 1981
9.167
(7.073)
Banks 1981
-0.943**
(0.329)
Constant
1.062
(2.940)
Prob > chi2 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.065
N 934
Note: *** 99% of conﬁdence level, ** 95%, and * 90%.
Clustered standard errors at district level in parenthesis.
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Table 7: Balancing test for co-variates used to estimate propensity scores
Kernel Matching
Mean %Bias %Reduct
Bias
p>|t|
Treated Control
Voter Turnout 1980
Unmatched 0.577 0.592 -9.1 0.208
Matched 0.595 0.596 -0.7 92.7 0.905
CiU Vote Share 1980
Unmatched 0.340 0.331 4.8 0.488
Matched 0.348 0.354 -3.3 32.5 0.574
Log Total Population
1981
Unmatched 6.985 6.479 34.0 0.000 ***
Matched 6.821 6.754 4.5 86.7 0.413
Share of Men 1981
Unmatched 0.503 0.509 -23.2 0.000 ***
Matched 0.503 0.504 -0.8 96.5 0.723
Share of Non-native 1981
Unmatched 0.169 0.118 42.5 0.000 ***
Matched 0.156 0.153 2.3 94.6 0.695
Share of Catalan
Speakers 1981
Unmatched 0.883 0.903 -16.4 0.015 **
Matched 0.890 0.900 -5.7 65.1 0.264
Share of BUP COU 1981
Unmatched 0.038 0.037 6.3 0.395
Matched 0.037 0.038 -3.9 37.4 0.472
Share of Mid Graduate
1981
Unmatched 0.016 0.014 12.3 0.089 *
Matched 0.015 0.016 -0.6 94.8 0.897
Share of Professional
Diploma 1981
Unmatched 0.015 0.012 15.9 0.016 **
Matched 0.014 0.014 3.4 78.5 0.543
Banks 1981
Unmatched 0.484 0.429 11.0 0.112
Matched 0.464 0.452 2.5 77.4 0.672
Note: *** 99% of conﬁdence level, ** 95%, and * 90%.
This bias is deﬁned as the diﬀerence of the mean values of the treatment group and the (not matched / matched) non treatment group, divided by
the square root of the average sample variance in the treatment group and the not matched non treatment group.
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Table 8: Number of municipalities included as control and treated (Part I)
District
Number
Municipalities
Treated Control
Total
Treated
On
Common
Support
Oﬀ
Common
Support
Total
Control
On
Common
Support
Oﬀ
Common
Support
Alt Camp 23 23 23 0 0 0 0
Alt Empordà 68 65 65 0 3 3 0
Alt Penedès 27 27 27 0 0 0 0
Alt Urgell 19 0 0 0 19 19 0
Alta Ribagorça 3 0 0 0 3 3 0
Anoia 33 33 31 2 0 0 0
Bages 35 34 33 1 1 1 0
Baix Camp 28 26 26 0 2 2 0
Baix Ebre 12 0 0 0 12 12 0
Baix Empordà 36 34 34 0 2 2 0
Baix Llobregat 29 29 22 7 0 0 0
Baix Penedès 14 0 0 0 14 14 0
Barcelonès 5 5 1 4 0 0 0
Berguedà 30 0 0 0 30 30 0
Cerdanya 16 0 0 0 16 16 0
Conca de Barberà 22 0 0 0 22 22 0
Garraf 6 6 6 0 0 0 0
Garrigues 24 24 24 0 0 0 0
Garrotxa 21 21 21 0 0 0 0
Gironès 25 25 24 1 0 0 0
Maresme 30 28 26 2 2 2 0
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Table 9: Number of municipalities included as control and treated (Part II)
District
Number
Municipalities
Treated Control
Total
Treated
On
Common
Support
Oﬀ
Common
Support
Total
Control
On
Common
Support
Oﬀ
Common
Support
Montsià 12 0 0 0 12 12 0
Noguera 30 29 29 0 1 1 0
Osona 51 50 50 0 1 1 0
Pallars Jussà 14 0 0 0 14 14 0
Pallars Sobirà 15 0 0 0 15 15 0
Pla d'Urgell 16 0 0 0 16 16 0
Pla de l'Estany 11 0 0 0 11 11 0
Priorat 23 0 0 0 23 23 0
Ribera d'Ebre 14 0 0 0 14 14 0
Ripollès 20 0 0 0 20 20 0
Segarra 21 21 21 0 0 0 0
Segrià 37 36 34 2 1 1 0
Selva 25 22 22 0 3 3 0
Solsonès 15 0 0 0 15 15 0
Tarragonès 20 20 18 2 0 0 0
Terra Alta 12 0 0 0 12 12 0
Urgell 20 20 20 0 0 0 0
Val d'Aran 9 0 0 0 9 9 0
Vallès Occidental 22 22 17 5 0 0 0
Vallès Oriental 42 40 36 4 2 2 0
Total 935 613 583 30 323 323 0
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Table 10: The Eﬀect of TV3 on Voter Turnout in the 1980-1984 Catalan Parliamentary
Elections
Change in Voter Turnout 1980-1984
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Availability of TV3 in April 1984 0.105***
(0.010)
0.038**
(0.010)
0.078***
(0.015)
0.031**
(0.009)
Control Variables
Change in Total Population 1981-1984 -0.179*
(0.092)
-0.194**
(0.086)
-0.133
(0.087)
Change in Share of Men 1981-1984 0.0815
(0.255)
0.154
(0.245)
0.158
(0.249)
Change in Share of Non-native 1981-1986 0.645***
(0.108)
0.211**
(0.103)
0.564***
(0.096)
Change in Share of Catalan Speakers 1981-1986 0.006
(0.041)
0.048
(0.032)
0.018
(0.032)
Change in Share of BUP COU 1981-1986 -0.658**
(0.202)
-0.689***
(0.173)
-0.672**
(0.198)
Change in Share of Mid Graduate 1981-1986 -0.103
(0.300)
-0.338
(0.311)
-0.246
(0.353)
Change in Share of Professional Diploma 1981-1986 0.432
(0.258)
0.183
(0.327)
0.254
(0.383)
Banks 1984 0.045***
(0.011)
0.026**
(0.009)
0.044***
(0.008)
District Fixed Eﬀects X
Province Fixed Eﬀects X
R2 0.202 0.361 0.469 0.369
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 - 0.000
N 904 904 904 904
Note: *** 99% of conﬁdence level, ** 95%, and * 90%.
Clustered robust standard errors at district level (in parenthesis) except for Column 3 where we instead
include district ﬁxed eﬀects and robust standard errors.
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Table 11: The Eﬀect of TV3 on CiU Vote Share in the 1980-1984 Catalan Parliamentary
Elections
Change in CiU Vote Share 1980-1984
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Availability of TV3 in April 1984 0.311***
(0.006)
0.136***
(0.021)
0.066**
(0.022)
0.096***
(0.011)
Control Variables
Change in Total Population 1981-1984 -0.420**
(0.195)
-0.149
(0.124)
-0.116
(0.156)
Change in Share of Men 1981-1984 -0.981
(0.621)
-0.354
(0.443)
-0.381
(0.577)
Change in Share of Non-native 1981-1986 1.932***
(0.253)
0.272*
(0.161)
1.197***
(0.168)
Change in Share of Catalan Speakers 1981-1986 -0.237**
(0.111)
-0.054
(0.048)
-0.157*
(0.083)
Change in Share of BUP COU 1981-1986 0.231
(0.444)
0.141
(0.312)
0.136
(0.353)
Change in Share of Mid Graduate 1981-1986 0.342
(0.682)
-0.474
(0.422)
-0.392
(0.480)
Change in Share of Professional Diploma 1981-1986 1.693**
(0.560)
-0.398
(0.447)
0.427
(0.506)
Banks 1984 0.076**
(0.023)
0.034**
(0.015)
0.065***
(0.016)
District Fixed Eﬀects X
Province Fixed Eﬀects X
R2 0.418 0.651 0.816 0.734
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 - 0.000
N 904 904 904 904
Note: *** 99% of conﬁdence level, ** 95%, and * 90%.
Clustered robust standard errors at district level (in parenthesis) except for Column 3 where we instead
include district ﬁxed eﬀects and robust standard errors.
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Table 12: Placebo Tests on Voter Turnout in the 1980-1984 Catalan Parliamentary
Elections
Change in Voter turnout 1980-1984
(1) (2) (3)
Availability of TV3 in April 1984 0.077
(0.015)
Placebo 1: Availability of TV3 in December 1984 -0.126
(0.087)
-0.125
(0.087)
Placebo 2: Fake Treatment Group -0.002
(0.012)
Control Variables
Change in Total Population 1981-1984 -0.210**
(0.085)
-0.210
(0.085)
-0.030
(0.151)
Change in Share of Men 1981-1984 0.205
(0.237)
0.191
(0.239)
0.954
(0.649)
Change in Share of Non-native 1981-1986 0.212**
(0.105)
0.221
(0.104)
0.160
(0.176)
Change in Share of Catalan Speakers 1981-1986 0.047
(0.032
0.047
(0.032)
0.075
(0.071)
Change in Share of BUP COU 1981-1986 -0.731***
(0.172)
-0.694
(0.172)
-0.497**
(0.246)
Change in Share of Mid Graduate 1981-1986 -0.379
(0.313)
-0.340
(0.311)
-0.674*
(0.397)
Change in Share of Professional Diploma 1981-1986 0.123
(0.327)
0.179
(0.326)
-0.192
(0.523)
Banks 1984 0.020**
(0.009)
0.024
(0.009)
0.024*
(0.013)
District Fixed Eﬀects X X X
R2 0.468 0.476 0.536
Prob>F - - -
N 904 904 319
Note: *** 99% of conﬁdence level, ** 95%, and * 90%.
Robust standard errors (in parenthesis).
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Table 13: Placebo Tests on CiU vote share in the 1980-1984 Catalan Parliamentary
Elections
Change in CiU Vote Share 1980-1984
(1) (2) (3)
Availability of TV3 in April 1984 0.066**
(0.022)
Placebo 1: Availability of TV3 in December 1984 -0.000
(0.086)
0.001
(0.086)
Placebo 2: Fake Treatment Group -0.000
(0.019)
Control Variables
Change in Total Population 1981-1984 -0.148
(0.125)
-0.149
(0.123)
-0.167
(0.264)
Change in Share of Men 1981-1984 -0.343
(0.441)
-0.354
(0.444)
-0.364
(1.262)
Change in Share of Non-native 1981-1986 0.264
(0.160)
0.272*
(0.161)
0.223
(0.262)
Change in Share of Catalan Speakers 1981-1986 -0.053
(0.048)
-0.054
(0.048)
0.040
(0.076)
Change in Share of BUP COU 1981-1986 0.110
(0.315)
0.141
(0.312)
0.768
(0.715)
Change in Share of Mid Graduate 1981-1986 -0.508
(0.421)
-0.474
(0.422)
-1.186
(0.883)
Change in Share of Professional Diploma 1981-1986 -0.445
(0.450)
-0.398
(0.448)
-2.012**
(0.998)
Banks 1984 0.031**
(0.014)
0.034**
(0.015)
0.057**
(0.024)
District Fixed Eﬀects X X X
R2 0.815 0.816 0.836
Prob>F - - -
N 904 904 319
Note: *** 99% of conﬁdence level, ** 95%, and * 90%.
Robust standard errors (in parenthesis).
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Table 14: Duration Treatment on Voter Turnout in the 1980-1984 Catalan Parliamen-
tary Elections
Change in Voter Turnout 1980-1984
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Duration Treatment 0.167***
(0.020)
0.046**
(0.014)
0.348***
(0.037)
0.051**
(0.017)
Control Variables
Change in Total Population 1981-1984 -0.569**
(0.232)
-0.482**
(0.183)
-0.550**
(0.233)
Change in Share of Men 1981-1984 -0.796
(0.547)
-0.438
(0.575)
-0.702
(0.536)
Change in Share of Non-native 1981-1986 1.279***
(0.193)
1.090***
(0.268)
1.267***
(0.213)
Change in Share of Catalan Speakers 1981-1986 0.004
(0.093)
-0.033
(0.085)
0.022
(0.092)
Change in Share of BUP COU 1981-1986 -1.695**
(0.546)
-1.938***
(0.488)
-1.766**
(0.545)
Change in Share of Mid Graduate 1981-1986 -0.442
(0.357)
-0.587*
(0.340)
-0.378
(0.352)
Change in Share of Professional Diploma 1981-1986 -0.426
(0.469)
-0.351
(0.498)
-0.718
(0.435)
Banks 1984 0.042**
(0.011)
0.013
(0.015)
0.034**
(0.012)
District Fixed Eﬀects X
Province Fixed Eﬀects X
R2 0.231 0.479 0.522 0.485
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 608 608 608 608
Note: *** 99% of conﬁdence level, ** 95%, and * 90%.
Duration Treatment: 1: between 4 and 8 months, and 0: less than 4 months.
Clustered robust standard errors at district level (in parenthesis) except for Column 3 where we instead
include district ﬁxed eﬀects and robust standard errors.
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Table 15: Duration Treatment on CiU Vote Share in the 1980-1984 Catalan Parliamen-
tary Elections
Change in CiU Vote Share 1980-1984
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Duration Treatment 0.300***
(0.010)
0.092**
(0.023)
0.177***
(0.031)
0.161***
(0.030)
Control Variables
Change in Total Population 1981-1984 0.313
(0.191)
0.113
(0.160)
0.229
(0.173)
Change in Share of Men 1981-1984 -0.377
(0.580)
0.701
(0.489)
0.226
(0.520)
Change in Share of Non-native 1981-1986 1.986***
(0.204)
0.985***
(0.198)
1.362***
(0.285)
Change in Share of Catalan Speakers 1981-1986 -0.570***
(0.107)
-0.330***
(0.081)
-0.403**
(0.112)
Change in Share of BUP COU 1981-1986 0.391
(0.576)
-0.762*
(0.421)
-0.234
(0.511)
Change in Share of Mid Graduate 1981-1986 0.928**
(0.289)
0.595
(0.435)
0.841**
(0.318)
Change in Share of Professional Diploma 1981-1986 0.279
(0.695)
-0.391
(0.516)
-0.476
(0.631)
Banks 1984 0.086***
(0.020)
0.015
(0.016)
0.046**
(0.017)
District Fixed Eﬀects X
Province Fixed Eﬀects X
R2 0.421 0.736 0.806 0.780
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 608 608 608 608
Note: *** 99% of conﬁdence level, ** 95%, and * 90%.
Duration Treatment: 1: between 4 and 8 months, and 0: less than 4 months.
Clustered robust standard errors at district level (in parenthesis) except for Column 3 where we instead
include district ﬁxed eﬀects and robust standard errors.
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